The audit risks of family firms are commonly perceived to be higher than non-family firms. However, the family firm may also appoint higher quality external auditor to reduce the information asymmetry, enhance credibility of the financial report, and increase firm value. Using unique unbalanced panel data of 2724 firm-year observations of firm listed in the main board of Hong Kong during the period 2001-2009, we find that family firms tend to more likely to choose Big N auditors, this is consistent with the signaling hypothesis. Surprisingly, contrasting the perceived higher audit risk, they incur lower audit fees. Our results also show the independent audit committee member with multiple directorships are not affected by their busyness. These results are robust to alternative definitions of family firms. Our results suggest that the choice of external auditors matters to audit risk for family firms.
Introduction
Recently, family firms in Hong Kong have received increasing attention include connected transactions and the firms' corporate governance issue. The prevalence of family controlled firms in Hong Kong and their potential incentive to "tunneling" (e.g. Cheung et al. 2006, Lei and Song, 2011) raise the question of how family firm influence various aspects of monitoring mechanisms such as external audit. Related party transactions regularly occur in family firms and internal control are vastly different from non-family firms. The audit risks of family firms are generally perceived higher as internal control are inferior. External audit are often considered as an inevitable one of the effective external corporate governance mechanisms to mitigate the agency problems and reduce the information asymmetry and enhance credibility of financial reporting. Do family firms in Hong Kong select higher quality auditor? Higher audit risks given the same profit level of firms imply more audit workload thus higher audit fee. Do family firms pay higher audit fee? This paper examines the effect of family ownership on the auditor selection as well as audit fee in Hong Kong.
According to agency theory, family owners pay more efforts to monitor managers than other types of large shareholders, suggesting that in compared to non-family firm, Type I agency problem may be less prevalent in family firms as less information asymmetry, conflict of interest inherent in manager-owner arrangements and internal monitoring improvement (Anderson et al., 2003) . However, Type II agency problem is perceived to be more severe in family firm as family owners may have both incentive and the ability to extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders which is harmful to firm value. Overall, theories concerning Type I and II agency problems predict that family firms have lower demand for high-quality auditors On the contrary, Carey et al. (2000) investigate the demand for audit quality in family firms and find that the demand for voluntary audits increases when agency costs increase. They argue that the incentives for family firms to extract private benefits as well as their propensity to influence the financial reporting process are high which raise agency costs (Anderson et al., 2003) . In this viewpoint family firms are more likely to appoint Big N auditors to ensure high quality audit to signal they are willing to adopt sound corporate governance practice. In summary, these two contradicting theories imply that the likelihood of family firms to appoint high quality auditor is still in question.
Similarly, for effect on the audit fees, the demand-side theory suggests that family firms have lower demand for quality audit due to their less severe Type I agency problems and more severe Type II agency problems, therefore accordingly incur lower audit fees. However, for the perspective of supply-side theory, in the viewpoint of auditor, since the incentives for family firms to extract private benefits as well as their propensity to influence the financial reporting process are high and thus are higher likely to raise agency costs. Consequently, increasing agency costs cause higher assessed audit risk in audit planning stage and accordingly make high audit efforts to mitigate the risk, resulting in higher audit fee. In contrast, family ownership can also be perceived to improve internal monitoring and diminish conflict of interest inherent in manager-owner arrangements and thus reduce assessed audit risk in audit planning stage and therefore subsequently resulted in lower audit fee. Therefore, whether family firms are more or less audit fee than those of non-family firms is also still debatable.
Hong Kong institutional settings present an interesting and suitable arena to test the related hypotheses. Unlike those in developed economies, Hong Kong is a mixture of the West and East. The legal environment of HK is strongest legal protections among all emerging markets, (see La Porta et al., 2000) implying that financial reporting quality is also scrutinized. Also, the listing rules require disclosure of all material connected transactions. Besides, there is evidence of tunneling in HK (Cheung et al., 2006, Lei and Song, 2011 Our paper contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First, response to the recent call for the study on family firms (Trotman & Trotman, 2010) , we examine how family control influence the firm's decision in auditor choice and audit fee within the context of developing economies. As family firms have a distinctive ownership structure with a different type of agency problem, omitting family influence on the analyses of auditor choice and audit fee may create substantial bias. To the best of our knowledge there are few prior studies examined the family influence on audit choice using Hong Kong data, our study also fill this gap. Secondly, our study explores other determinants of auditor choice and audit fee that have not been studied before such as the characteristics 1 http://www.director.co.uk/magazine/2011/3_march/john-elkington_64_07.html of audit committee, little attention has been paid to the relationship between multiple directorships and auditors in auditing literature, we also extend literature by investigate the effect of independent audit committee member with multiple directorship on auditor choice and audit fee using Hong Kong data. Finally, our findings will also shed light on the practice of family firms on audit monitoring which is expected to help the investors and public to know more on family firm corporate governance mechanisms to protect their interest.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews prior literature and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the sample and research design. Section 4 presents our empirical results, and we analyze their robustness in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes concluding remarks.
Literature review and hypothesis development 2.0 Studies on Family firms in Hong Kong
The early studies in Hong Kong find that the family control have an adverse effect on corporate governance. Family members presented on corporate boards significantly is found to reduce the effectiveness of audit committees (Chau & Leung, 2006) , the effectiveness of Board independence on financial disclosures (Chen & Jaggi, 2000) and is likely to perform earning management (Jaggi et al., 2009 ) and is likely less the level of information disclosure (Chau & Gray, 2002) . Using 346 firm-year observations and covering the periods of 2001 , Lam and Lee (2012 indicate family ownership have an adverse effect on the relationship between board committees, remuneration committee, and the performance of public companies in Hong Kong. In summary, these prior studies for Hong Kong implied that the family ownership generally have adverse effect on corporate governance in early year.
Family firms and auditor choice
2.1.1 Type I agency problems and auditor choice Several prior research argues that Big N auditors provide better quality service than non-Big N auditors due to their scale, technical expertise, and reputation risk (Barton, 2005; DeAngelo, 1981) . Therefore, it is argued that the tendency of a firm to appoint a Big N audit firm increases when the severity of its Type I agency problems increases and vice versa. With the view that families generally have strong incentives to monitor managers and minimize information asymmetry and therefore face less severe Type I problems compared to non-family firms (Ali et al., 2007; Anderson et al., 2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Wang, 2006) . Consistent with this theory, the empirical studies also find that family firms are less likely to select Big N auditors probably due to lower Type I agency costs (e.g Anderson et al., 2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) .
With the argument discussed above, in comparison to non-family firms, we expect that family firms may have lower demand for high-quality auditors who is generally considered as a monitoring function in alleviating Type I agency problems between managers and investors.
Type II agency problems and auditor choice
Conversely, due to concentration of ownership, firm families are subject to severe Type II agency conflicts between large and small shareholders. More specifically, the close control over the board creates unique entrenchment opportunity which allows controlling family owners to expropriate minority shareholders through self-beneficial activities such as related party transactions in easy way, without challenged by the board of directors (Claessens et al., 2002) . Then it is expected that they would be more willing to increase the financial reporting opacity and hence be less likely to hire a higher-quality auditor.
Signaling theory on auditor choice
However, the perceived entrenchment problem as discussion above may come at a price to the family owners and their firms. Claessens et al. (2002) argue that external investors anticipate this potential problem and therefore discount the firm value and might ask for risk premium, leading it difficult and costly for equities or bonds financing.
External audit are often argued as an effective external monitoring mechanism to mitigate the agency conflicts and to improve financial reporting opacity. Therefore it can enhance firms' financing market. Given the expectation of Type II agency problem in family firm, consequently, the family owners, especially from large family, are willing to invest for the long term success, may more likely to employ Big N auditors to signify their incentives to reduce agency problem by adopting sound corporate governance practice and also to signify their financial reporting credibility and reliability in exchange for lower cost of capital.
Consistent with this theory, Leung et al. (2012) 
Family control and Audit fee
Prior studies have examined the relationship between firm characteristics and audit fees in term of both the demand-side and supply-side theories.
The demand-side theory perspective
Family firms' demands on the audit quality are in twofold. The direct and close monitoring of firm activities by family owners as discussed earlier can lower information asymmetry between owners and managers, therefore reducing the demand for high-extensive and high-quality auditing services proxied by the audit fee. Moreover, the entrenchment problems within family firms may result in family owners' greater demand for opaqueness in financial reporting, which further reduces the demand for high-quality auditing services. In summary, the demand-side theory suggests that family firms have lower demand for external auditing.
The supply-side theory perspective
Viewed from the supply-side theory, auditors are required to assess client-related risks and to perform procedures to mitigate audit risks to an acceptable level. The audit fee paid is positively related to the audit work done to mitigate those audit risks. Prior have documented that the deteminants of audit fees are associated with firms' size, risk, and complexity (Abbott et al., 2003; Bedard & Johnstone, 2004; Bell et al., 2001; Firth, 1997 ; S. W. M. Ho & Ng, 1996) .
As argued above that family firms may either alleviate or aggravate agency problems. The close monitoring and the concern on the whole family reputation reduces the overall audit risk assessed by the auditors of material misstatements in financial reporting which may in turn arrange fewer audits works to mitigate their audit risks resulting in lower audit fees. Ali et al. (2007) and Wang (2006) document that family firms have better quality earnings in US. On the other hand, auditors may increase the assessed risk of fraudulent reporting due to potential expropriation incentives of family owners (Type II agency problems) (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) . Khalil et al. (2011) provide evidence that Family ownership may change an auditor's exposure to future litigation through the misappropriation of assets and/or the financial reporting quality.
Overall, due to the mixed effects of two types of agency problems on family firms' financial reporting process, the supply-side theory and demand-side theory provide alternative predictions on the assessed audit risk of family firms.
For the empirical result, J. L. Y. Ho and Kang (2010) found that US family firms tend to incur lower audit fees. Similarly, of particular relevance to our study, Gul et al.
(1997) report a negative association between audit fees and family ownership in Hong Kong using 134 company-year observations from 1993-1994. Therefore, following this study, our hypothesis is:
H1b: Compared to non-family firms, family firms incur lower audit fee

Audit committee Multiple Directorships, Audit fee and Auditor choice
Audit committee has relevance and important role to ensure the quality financial reporting (Hunton & Rose, 2008) . Davison et al. (1984) find that the significant impact of interlocking directorates on the choice of auditor are important and Carcello et al. (2002) find a significant positive relationship between the number of outside directorships as a measure of expertise and audit fees. Their study suggests that boards with greater expertise will employ higher quality auditors, accordingly they will improve the overall corporate governance mechanism. However, Sharma and Iselin (2012) suggest that independent audit committee members with multiple directorship may be stretched too thinly to effectively perform their monitoring. Similarly Boo and Sharma (2008) argue that when directors serve on multiple board will spend less time on their board/audit committee role in any one of firm they served and, consequently, they may demand additional assurances from external auditors and demand a more extensive audit to protect their reputation capital. They also find positive relationship between board/audit committee multiple directorships and audit fees. Similarly, Hunton and Rose (2008) document that directors holding multiple directorships are less likely to accept an auditor's restatement recommendation for the previous year than directors with a single directorship due to the adverse effect on their reputation capital. It suggests that directors holding multiple directorships demand for high audit quality. From a supply side perspective, as directors with multiple directorships devote less time to monitor management, audit risk would be perceived as higher by auditors, leading to an increase in the extent of audit work. Therefore, it is expected that there is a positive association between independent audit committee member with multiple directorships and audit fees and the likelihood of appointment of quality auditor proxied by Big 5 firm. Hence, we hypothesize that:
H2a: Independent audit committee member with multiple directorships is more likely to appoint Big 5 Firms.
H2b: There is positive relationship between independent audit committee member with multiple directorship and audit fees.
Methodology and Model
Data and sample
The original samples are all firms traded on the Hong Kong main board during the period 2001-2009 for which financial and audit fee data are available on the Datastream
International. The family control, family ownership and other corporate governance data are hand-collected from both annual reports and public announcements which are available on the HKEx website 2 and the directorship data is hand-collected from Webb-site 3 .
We also excluded the utilities and financial firms and the observation without audit committee information or or did not set up audit committee in early year from the sample. Table 1 . 
Measuring family ownership and control
We use two different ways to measure the impact of family firms: (1) family control which is a dummy variable that equals one for family controlled firms and 0 otherwise and; (2) family ownership which is the percentage of shares held by the family as a group.
The variable family control captures the impact of family control, while family ownership addresses the impact of different levels of share the family held. The definition of family control is to be discussion below.
There is no universal accepted measure or criterion for identifying a family control.
We definite the firm is family-controlled when the family has significant influence on the company. Under international financial reporting standards (IFRS), if an investor holds at least 20 percent of the voting power of an investee, the investor is presumed to have significant influence. Consistent with this notion, a number of previous studies use a 20% cut off point to identify family firms (e.g La Porta et al., 1999; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009; Villalonga & Amit, 2006) . However, IFRS also stipulated that board of directors'
representation is as alternative evidence of significant influence. We argued that it may be a good proxy to measure the substantive control of family over the board. Therefore, consistent with Jaggi et al. (2009) , we define the firms as family controlled when two or more members of the controlling family are appointed as directors which implied the corresponding family has significant influence over the board decision in substance.
Model and variable measurement
We 
Control variables
Consistent with prior studies, we expect that client firm size, complexity, and risk will influence auditor choices and audit fees (e.g Carcello et al., 2002; Gul et al., 2003; W. M. Ho & Ng, 1996; Lin and Liu, 2009 ). We proxy firm size by the natural logarithm of total assets (LOGASSET), control for firm complexity by natural logarithm of receivable (LOGREC), the number of subsidiaries (NSUB) and control for profitability by revenue (REV). We also control for firm risk by return on assets ( size and lower audit committee independence, lower higher qualified and disclaimer opinion in the previous year, the differences is statistically significant. Family firms appear to be higher multiple directorship level on audit committee than non-family firms.
Empirical results
Summary statistics
However, this difference is statistically insignificant. is significantly and positively correlated with both auditor choice and audit fee. All are consistent with our hypotheses. In general, the correlations between independent variables are small. Overall suggests low multicollinearity problem. Table 5 Panel A presents the regression results to test H1a, H2a. As discussed earlier, the dummy variable FAMCTRL and FAMOWN is used to capture the impact of family firms' characteristics on auditor choice. We find a significant and positive coefficient on both FAMCTRL (0.624, p = 0.009) and FAMOWN (1.499, p = 0.001),
Empirical results for auditor choice on family ownership
indicating that compared to non-family firms, family firms are more likely to hire Big 5 auditors which is consistent with the signaling theory that due to perceive Type II agency problems embedded in the family firms, listed family firms in Hong Kong demand high quality auditor than non-family firm to reassure outside investors and debtor that they are not expropriating the firm, but adopting good corporate governance practice and performing credible financial reporting. We also find that a significant and positive coefficient on ACMD (0.218, p = 0.000) in both family firm measures), which support the hypothesis H2a that that firms with higher Audit committee multiple directorship level are more likely to use Big 5 auditor. Consistent with prior studies and my expectation, the selection of Big-5 auditors, positively associated with client firm size, revenue level and negatively associated with the presence of qualified or disclaimer opinion in last year.
22 Results for some control variables are not consistent with prior studies (Abbott et al., 2003) . In particular, we find significantly negative coefficient on board independence (PINED, both p = 0.000), audit committee size (LOGACSIZE, both p = 0.000), audit committee independence (PINAC, p = 0.035 & 0.038 respectively) and financial and accounting expertise on audit committee (ACMD, both p = 0.000), which means that demand for high-quality auditor is lower when independent Board and independent audit committee, higher audit committee size and more independent audit committee member with auditing and finance expertise presented. It supports the substitution theory on sound corporate governance that demand for high-quality auditor is lower when independent board, independent audit committee, higher audit committee size, and 23 independent audit committee member with auditing and finance expertise presented, implying they may be an effective monitoring mechanism to improve financial reporting quality therefore substitute the demand of high quality auditor. Table 6 is the regression results to test H1b, H2b. We find a significant and negative coefficient on both family firm measures namely FAMCTRL (-0.081, p = 0.008) and FAMOWN (-0.134, p = 0.021), which supported the hypothesis H1b that compared to non-family firms, family firms incur higher audit fee. We find a significant and negative coefficient on ACMD (both are -0.014, p = 0.030) indicating that independent audit committee member with multiple directorship incur low audit fee which is the opposite direction as H2b predict. We conjecture that this is because multiple directorships imply better quality directors, and busyness of these directors is less prevalent in Hong Kong.
Regression results for audit fees on family ownership
(see Lei and Deng, 2013) It implies that the multiple directorship signal the expertise and competent monitor over financial report therefore lower the audit risk which in term lower the audit fee.
Our results for control variables are generally consistent with prior research.
Consistent with expectation, audit fees are higher for firms with greater size (LOGASSET) and complexity (LOGREC, NSUB) as indicated by their specific significant and positive coefficients. I find Big-N audit firms charge a premium for their quality. ROA is negative associated with audit fee, commensurate with lower audit risk.
As indicated by the positive coefficient, the firms with (LAQQDOPIN) and delay in releasing annual report (DELAY) incur higher audit fees, commensurate with higher audit risk and this higher audit workload. For corporate governance variable, firms that have CEO duality (CEODUALITY) incur lower audit free, it implies that when the functions of CEO and board chair are not separated, the board chair may not be willing to demand a higher quality audit thus incur lower audit fee. Interestingly, we find that 24 LOGBDSIZE, LOGACSIZE and PACAFE are positively associated with auditor fee which are inconsistent with the results from audit choice model. It implies although they did not select Big-N auditor, they also invite more extensive audit work from their auditor. In Table 6 Panel B, we test whether the audit pricing pattern changes between the firms appointing Big 5 and non-Big 5 firms. Similarly, we also observe a significant and negative relation between family ownership and audit fees for both Big N sample and non-Big N sample. Table 7 and 8 display the results, and are similar to those for the above results. 
Robustness tests for Alternative definitions of family firm
There are diverse definitions of family firm for existing studies. These alternative definitions may produce different results. Another common definition is to use a 20% cut off point to identify family firms (FAMOWNNEW). We also use also investigate the effect with this measure and the results remain robust. Table 9 and 10 display the results. 
Conclusion
We examine the relation between family ownership and control, and audit committee multiple directorships level on audit fee and auditor choice in Hong Kong Our results suggest that the choice of external auditors matters to audit risk for family firms. We also find family firms (measured by family control and family ownership) pay lower audit fee than non-family firms. This is consistent with lower Type I agency problem argument (i.e., Lower assessed client-related risks due to family owners closer monitoring of management, lower information asymmetry and higher incentive to maintain family reputation). More specifically, the benefit effect of lower Type I agency problem in family firm outweighs the harm of increasing Type II agency problem.
Similarly, Firms with higher audit committee multiple directorship level is more likely to use Big 5 auditor but incur lower audit fee. These results are robust to alternative definitions of family firms.
Our research extends existing studies on the relationship between firms' ownership, auditor choice, and audit fees by investigating the associations between them simultaneously. Our research also adds to extant audit committee literature. Future studies could further explore whether family characteristics affects the non-audit fees and auditor switch and investigate whether there are other potential reasons why family firms incur lower audit fee such as networking.
